



**IRAN:**

**View from the LEFT**

**Jan 15, 2026**

**Special Edition**

***No to International Intervention, Yes to Worldwide Support!***

The Iranian people's struggle for bread, freedom, and human dignity must remain independent and rooted in their own collective will. Any form of foreign military attack or coercive intervention would only deepen violence, fuel instability, and ultimately undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the popular movement. Iran's recent history shows that external intervention does not bring democracy or justice, but instead inflicts further suffering on ordinary people and strengthens repressive forces.

At the same time, international passivity is neither acceptable nor neutral. The global community has a responsibility to stand in solidarity with the Iranian people by supporting their legitimate demands through political, diplomatic, and human rights mechanisms. This includes condemning repression, demanding accountability for state violence, supporting independent investigations, and exerting sustained pressure to protect fundamental rights. Such international support, distinct from intervention, can help curb repression and amplify the voices of those peacefully struggling for freedom and dignity.

***Theses and Perspectives on Major Geopolitical Trends and Rivalries***

***Overview***

The following theses outline key perspectives on the most significant geopolitical trends and rivalries likely to shape the international system over the next two years. Mapping these developments, particularly their accelerating dynamics in today's world, is inherently difficult. We live in an unsettled and rapidly changing global environment in which even achieving a fragile and tolerable equilibrium for humanity appears increasingly unlikely. Progress toward a clearer understanding is nevertheless possible through constructive, sustained, and purposeful engagement, and by illuminating the interplay of power and contradiction, continuity and rupture. The purpose of presenting these theses is to offer a foundation for informed action and a point of departure for thoughtful dialogue.

**[International@leftpartyiran.org](mailto:International@leftpartyiran.org)**

**Theses and Perspectives on Major Geopolitical Trends and Rivalries**

**Trumpism and Its Geopolitical Impact**

1. Donald Trump's election to the presidency of the United States will exert a decisive influence on global developments over the next three years.

2. The trends and processes associated with this moment neither originated with Trump's election nor will they end with his presidency. "Trumpism" should be understood as a response to the cumulative effects of long-term structural shifts in both the United States and the global system.

3. In its current form, Trumpism, often incorrectly equated with fascism, is a contradictory and tension-ridden synthesis of inward-looking nationalism, “high-technocracy,” neoconservatism, and neoliberalism, combined with the practices of authoritarian right-wing populism.
4. For this reason, Trumpism cannot be seen as inaugurating a coherent new historical era. Its authoritarian character, internal contradictions, and economic shortcomings are likely to provoke significant resistance. Nonetheless, elements of Trumpism have gained a more entrenched position within the “international order.” A clear indication of this trend is the U.S. National Security Strategy published in November 2025, whose defining feature is not merely the expansion but the institutionalization of the “America First” doctrine across the full spectrum of foreign policy.
5. Internationally, this shift manifests itself in several ways: the introduction of new forms of coercion in international relations; the erosion of solidarity, particularly toward poorer countries; the weakening of global institutions and international law in favor of bilateralism; the narrowing of foreign policy to the interests of limited power circles under the banner of national interest; environmental destruction (“crimes against nature”); transactional deal-making at the expense of weaker states and the principle of sovereign equality; and aggressive anti-left politics.
6. Domestically, Trumpism and the authoritarian right pursue policies centred on the dismantling of public services and social security systems, the intensification of social, cultural, and religious gaps, and the deep polarization of society.
7. Within this ideological and political amalgam, high-technocracy represents the future-oriented component of Trumpism. By high-technocracy, we mean a political order in which highly specialized experts, along with the owners and managers of advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and automation, play a dominant role in shaping core policy decisions. High-technocracy is not unique to Trumpism; rather, it is the non-democratic political expression of the emerging economic order and functions as its complement. Governance under this model relies less on democratic participation and more on data, algorithms, and technological elites.
8. In the triangular relationship between state, capital, and citizen, high-technocracy tends to bury democracy under layers of “data.” In relations among states, it elevates control over artificial intelligence and other knowledge-based industries to the central arenas of geostrategic and geoeconomic competition. In this sense, it is not an exclusively American phenomenon, but a global instrument.
9. The European Union and China are the primary targets of Trumpism: the European Union as a weakened civilizational competitor facing the risk of decline, and China as a structural and long-term rival.
10. Thus far, the European Union has confronted Trumpism indirectly, not at the primary site of contention, but through the war in Ukraine and its relations with

Russia. Originally, the European project, despite its neo-colonial dimensions, was conceived as an effort to ensure continental security, economic integration, and the preservation of a just peace; today, it risks being diverted from this path. Under the banner of defending a just peace, the EU may simultaneously drift toward confrontation with Russia and tacit accommodation with Trumpism.

11. The alternative approach advocated by a democratic and peace-oriented Europe is clear: “No to NATO, no to an anti-Russian alliance; yes to a secure, autonomous, and self-reliant Europe.”
12. China, despite internal contradictions, possesses significant advantages over the European Union, including economic scale and dynamism, a central role in BRICS, an expanding presence in Asia and Africa, and deep entanglement with the U.S. domestic economy. These factors give China the capacity to play an important role in constraining Trumpism, maintaining balance in the international system, and promoting governance through international law. Nevertheless, global dynamics are moving toward a fluid and unstable form of polarization. By “fluid polarization,” we mean a system of overlapping, issue-based alliances dominated by major powers. While this configuration may offer smaller states greater room for positive balancing, it does not represent a stable order but rather a transitional condition of “ordered disorder.”
13. We are critical of the authoritarian character of China’s political system and its hegemonic

tendencies within the BRICS framework. At the same time, we support the outcomes of Chinese and BRICS initiatives as far as they strengthen international institutions and contribute to balance and equilibrium in global affairs.

14. Over the next two years, our neighbouring country, Russia, aside from the war in Ukraine, is unlikely to occupy a central position in broader international dynamics, despite its importance as a regional power.
15. The failure to contain climate change constitutes a direct and existential threat to humanity. This reality has led, on the one hand, to a growing emphasis on adaptation rather than mitigation, and on the other hand to the transformation of environmental crisis into a major driver of geopolitical competition and conflict.

### **The Future of Ukraine**

1. The immediate future of Ukraine is being framed through three competing “solutions”: the “Trump solution,” the “Russian solution,” and the “European solution.” It appears that the first two approaches, albeit with certain differences, envisage Ukraine’s borders being drawn more or less along the current front lines of the war.
2. The first approach seeks to de-escalate relations between the United States and Russia, while redirecting strategic competition toward China. This involves both a recalibration of U.S.–Russia relations and a form of economic concession in relations with Ukraine.

3. The second approach is based on the use of force to alter borders.
4. The third approach is fraught with the risk of escalating tensions with Russia and is accompanied by a troubling rise of militarism within the European Union.
5. We do not regard any of these three “solutions” as capable of ensuring a just, sustainable, and comprehensive peace. Rather, each represents, albeit in different ways, a regression in international relations toward a logic of “survival of the fittest.”
6. We have consistently argued that the war in Ukraine emerged from NATO’s eastward expansion; nevertheless, we hold Russia responsible as the initiator of the war, one that the United States, the United Kingdom, and much of the European Union have welcomed and sustained.
7. A just and durable peace, grounded in respect for the United Nations Charter and the principle of non-use of force to change borders, must address the security concerns of both Ukraine and Russia. The alternative is the perpetuation of war.

## **In the Middle East**

### **1. Continued tensions between Iran and the United States**

In the near term, the principal axis of tension between Iran and the United States will remain Iran’s nuclear program and, increasingly, its missile program, largely the consequence of the Islamic Republic’s ambiguous and inconsistent policies. Within this framework, the conflict between Iran and Israel may also be shaped by, and subordinated to, these two issues. Our fundamental position on this tension

is the voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment.

### **2. The Gaza war and its impact on regional dynamics**

Whether the current situation in Gaza is resolved or prolonged will directly shape the future of the Palestinian condition. A political resolution could open the way to redefining Palestine’s place in the regional order. By contrast, the continuation of war and the absence of a political horizon risk further entrenching the long-standing impasse surrounding Palestinian rights. The post-ceasefire situation and the political positioning of Palestinian forces may, on the one hand, consolidate a lasting division of Gaza and its gradual depopulation, and on the other, plunge Palestine into a profound political vacuum. The positions adopted by Arab governments, particularly Saudi Arabia, have so far failed to offer a credible pathway toward the restoration of Palestinian rights. It is also evident that Israel, despite its significant military successes over the past two years, has suffered irreparable moral and legal damage under international law. Moreover, concerns among Arab states regarding Israel’s aggressive policies, concerns that before the “12-day war” were largely directed at the Islamic Republic, have increasingly shifted toward Israel itself. The overall outcome of these dynamics may be an “Abrahamic Peace,” granting Palestinians a limited degree of sovereignty while entrenching Israeli supremacy.

### **3. The strengthening of Turkey’s regional and extra-regional position**

Among Iran’s land-bordering neighbours, Turkey is the most powerful. President Erdoğan’s strategy of positioning Turkey as a bridge connecting Central Asia, through the framework of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), to

Europe and the Arab world; Turkey's role in developments in Syria before and after the collapse of the Assad regime; its decisive influence in the Azerbaijan–Armenia conflict; and its expanding presence in the Sahel region of Africa, combined with NATO membership and extensive bilateral agreements, have elevated Turkey to the status of an autonomous actor in major regional and extra-regional policymaking. In addition, the Turkish leadership appears to have embarked on a new approach to the long-standing “Kurdish complications,” adopting a strategy linked to Öcalan and the PKK. This shift could have important implications for Turkey's regional relations, particularly with Europe.

Turkey has consistently exploited regional instability to expand its influence, most notably through the rapid growth of its military exports, entry into construction, trade, and energy projects in crisis-affected regions such as northern Syria and the Caucasus, and the consolidation of new markets. With Turkey likely to gain control over the so-called “Trump Corridor” (the Zangezur Corridor), the balance of “cooperation and competition” between Turkey and Iran, already tilted toward rivalry following regime change in Syria, is expected to shift decisively in Turkey's favour.

#### **4. Geostrategic competition between China and the United States**

The Middle East has become a key arena of strategic competition between China and the United States. China's influence, primarily exercised through economic and diplomatic means, is steadily expanding. At the same time, the United States seeks to reconfigure its traditional alliances in a largely defensive effort to contain this trend.

For regional states, particularly Iran, this rivalry creates opportunities to pursue genuine national interests through

positive balancing and to foster more stable and diversified regional relations.

#### **5. The continued decline of the Middle East's position in the global economy**

Despite its geopolitical location and energy resources, the Middle East's share of the global economy and its overall influence on international affairs are likely to continue declining. The so-called “Middle East complications,” expressed through recurring crises and conflicts, are no longer believed to be an enduring “oil curse” or the construction of a Greater Middle East, but rather growing uncertainty and marginalization.

At the same time, this decline could be partially offset by the region's potential role as a strategic corridor for trade between East and West, as much as between the Global North and the South. Realizing such a role would require expanded regional cooperation grounded in a realistic peace-oriented foreign policy. Within this framework, the protection of Israel's interests and their guarantee for the West, particularly for Trumpism and its allied Evangelical constituencies, remains a central concern. This dynamic should be understood not simply as the product of a Zionist lobby overriding U.S. interests, but as an outcome rooted in Washington's own strategic calculations.

#### **6. The weakening of paramilitary groups and the regaining of power by the nation-state**

A gradual decline in the influence of non-state paramilitary groups in the Middle East has been underway for several years and is likely to continue. Political developments, international pressure, and more durable inter-state security arrangements are reinforcing the primacy of formal state institutions in military and security affairs, alongside stronger arms control within sovereign frameworks. We view this trend positively.

[\*\*International Relations Left Party of Iran\*\*](#)